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"Kuwait
Series" - by Gaylan King
Contents:
I thought I’d revisit my last Iraq piece and detail General Secord’s musings about the military operations we must pursue if we’re to finally achieve our national goals in Iraq. Over several dinners and a lot of discussion, General Secord outlined two essential operations that would have an immediate impact upon the situation in Iraq. He believes the U.S. must (1) immediately implement a 24/7-reconnaissance program producing complete coverage of the infamous Sunni Triangle and surrounding countryside. This program would also allow us to “see” enemy movement at night through infrared imaging (literally, even small animals radiate enough heat to register on such systems) and the ability to download and distribute these images in near-real-time to the U. S. Army command posts who can task immediate response. This action completely denies the enemy the ability to move men and weapons or to meet clandestinely. One of today’s Air Force’s great dissensions is the purchasing of significant numbers of the vastly expensive F-22 fighter at a time when we cannot meet the mission-needs for the kinds of conflicts in which we are currently engaged. For example, we no longer have any Forward Air Control (FAC) capability. The war on terrorism and any foreseeable conflict doesn’t require Mach 3 fighter aircraft (we need both in the inventory but the numbers are wrong), but a low-and-slow capability that we seem to have disregarded. In that vein, a private contractor would currently have to perform this reconnaissance program. Such a contractor does exist and is talking with the Army as I write this, thanks to our Generals Secord and Aderholt. After we’ve severely limited the Enemy’s movement through such a reconnaissance program, we must (2) sector off this whole area and thoroughly search it house-to-house, building-to-building, alley-to-alley, and mosque-to-mosque. All sanctuaries must be neutralized or revoked – period. The Islamic fighters and their weapons caches must be found. General Secord proposes that we surround and cordon off workable-sized areas in the major towns in the Sunni Triangle. This would be Tikrit, Felluja, Ramadi, Karbala, even Baghdad, and so on. Then we announce that we’re coming at a certain time and the occupants must be assembled outside of the structure. This eliminates the complaints about disturbing families in the middle of the night. Order them to bring out any weapons or contraband and there will be no penalty. Then, we thoroughly search the structure. If we find any additional weapons or explosives, we take the structure apart piece-by-piece or destroy it completely. Sound tough? It is. Will it succeed? You bet it will. We’ve lost too many of our great kids as we tried not to offend. Enough! We must repeat this process until we completely control these areas. After Saddam’s capture, the Arab world has generally chosen to deny that this success story will have any impact on Iraq’s future. Of course it will! I’ve spoken with people that had such a physically apparent dread and loathing of Saddam that you could imagine what it was like to talk with the average German after Hitler’s death. I’ve never experienced anything quite like it. Only now, for them, can a normal life be had. Iraq is a complex problem for several reasons. The Sunni make up approximately 15-20 % of the population of Iraq. They are the “other” major religious group (the Shii’a, are approximately 60% of the population). The rub is that the minority Sunni ruled Iraq for 500 years. Because most of Sadam’s Ba’ath regime was Sunni, they fear fewer opportunities in the “new” Iraq. Translated, the Shii’a remember Saddam’s misdeeds on the Sunni’s “watch” and aren’t about to let this minority back into power. Saddam was an ethnic Sunni, although not a religious leader, who derived most of his power from tribal and clan connections. Because of this situation, large numbers of Sunni chose to support Saddam to the very end feeling they have nothing to lose. The U. S. must devise a strategy to give the Sunni hope for proportional representation and opportunities within the future regime. There is an interesting line of thought currently prevalent in the Arab press. Kuwait is not ruled by a tyrant and openly supports American/Coalition goals. Kuwait is unique among the 22 members of the Arab League in this respect. Iraq invaded Kuwait twice and their Arab neighbors never raised a finger to help them nor did they condemn Saddam. Kuwaiti newspapers have published many editorials critical of Saddam and extremist Islam and “Pan-Arabism” in general. A few days ago a local editor narrowly missed opening a letter-bomb addressed to him. Kuwait is currently under a Terror Alert because of local shootings at American convoys and expatriates. The rest of the Arab press is consumed by debate about who Saddam really was, an Arab hero and leader who would unite (what took him so long!) the Arab world or an evil tyrant who deserved the world’s hatred and scorn. Some are furious that we somehow showed Saddam “disrespect” in airing the famous pictures after his capture. Others are fuming about another success by the arrogant Americans. The most troubling, to me, is the group that feels Saddam’s capture ended any hope of Arab leadership and power on both a regional and a world scale. In general, the Arab World seems tolerate despots with alarming ease and needs to examine not only the “cloth” of Arab statesmanship but the very “loom’ that wove it. Is the job finished in Iraq? Of course not! No one has said that it is. His ignoble capture is the single most positive event imaginable and ended, among civilized people, the myth that he was a great warrior and leader. Thank you, Lord!
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Iraq
16 -
December 20 2003 -
I’ve been in Kuwait for
the past three weeks and finally returned to Iraq.
We’ve all seen the same news stories and listened to
the TV “journalists”. Coalition Forces appear to have
begun a new campaign to actually pursue the enemy, no
matter the circumstances. 